is with men (Rev. 21.1-3). Then redeemed man will enter into the eternal sabbath rest of God (Heb. 4), as he dwells before him in the perfected creation.

This then is what we understand to be the structure of the biblical teaching on the sabbath. At creation, God called upon man to enter into his everlasting sabbath rest. This, man would have done as he enjoyed the perfect creation before God. But with man's sin, creation is placed under curse and man knows no rest with God. Redemption shall be perfected when redeemed man enters at last into God's sabbath rest in the new creation. The sabbath laws of the Old Testament were ceremonial anticipations of that final sabbath rest. The Lord's Day for Christians focusses the sabbath rest in the redemptive work of Christ, and declares that the new creation has already sprung into life in him. But, standing beside the Old Testament saint, we also anticipate the consummation of redemption in our observance of sabbath; this we do in our weekly celebration of redemption on the day which has been set apart by Christ's resurrection.

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JEHOVAH-JESUS: TOUCHED WITH THE FEELING OF OUR INFIRMITIES

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Misunderstandings of Calvinism are legion; the interplay of divine sovereignty with our human condition is complex and liable to defective interpretations. The revelation of God in his involvement with the reality of human suffering should, however, be given careful treatment; it is the source of inexpressible comfort in the midst of sorrow, gloom, and despair. Yet, the doctrine
of impassibility, that God (in His sovereignty) is incapable of, and exempt from, suffering, has received very little attention, even from the most capable of theologians. Even when the subject has been alluded to, reticence that the immutability of the Divine Being should be questioned has overshadowed the discussion, yielding conclusions that God is insusceptible to injury, emotionally unmov ed by the cosmic tragedy of sin and its effects; God cannot change; He is the same yesterday, today and forever.

On the other hand, inadequate and anthropomorphic discussions of God in our own day, from philosophical notions of God in the process of becoming, to Arminian views of God in dethronement, have little by way of commendation, even if they do provide a more possible view of God.

The impassibility of God is raised, not so much in connection with the doctrine of God, considered in abstraction, but with the Christological axioms of Chalcedon, and its implications for the doctrine of God. Does the formulation of 'true God' united with 'true man' imply that the former cannot suffer, whilst the latter does in an excruciating manner? This is of no mean importance; the kerygmatic proclamation of the early Church finds its genesis in the axiom: "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor. 5.19). ¹

Our own preaching is at risk, being removed from the purity of the earliest kerygma, if we consider either Chalcedon, or its implications, as unworthy of close scrutiny and adherence. We need to know how close the Lord is to our predicament; does He understand our pain? Does He feel our grief? Is He capable of knowing the emotional depths of our despair? It has to do with the relevancy of our theology and preaching in an age of violence. We need to know how far we can apply the doctrine of God to our human sensibilities: grief needs that support and a doctrine of transcendence, with no emotion, pain, or irritation seems to offer no relief, but casts us further into the loneliness and hopelessness of despair.

Related to this general theme of impassibility is the doctrine of theopaschitism, or, the suffering of God in the atonement. It is crudely stated in Sabellianism,
Patripassionism and Monarchianism. Theopaschitism, however, has a respectable history, and, if we are not incorrect in our analysis, has certain elements of biblical truth in it. But, there exist boundaries that we dare not transgress; these are limits set by Christian symbols which forbid infringement.

The background to the Chalcedon Confession is a matter of enormous importance, foundational to the via negative approach of this Christological symbol. In contrast to Arianism, the Son is declared to be homoousios with the Father. Jesus is not a semi-God; a created religious man. He is the pre-existent Lord; there was not a time when He was not, for He could say: "Before Abraham was, I am" (Jn. 8.58). Furthermore, He was not of mere similar substance (homoiousios), but the same substance (homoousios).

Over against Docetism (and Anabaptism) if affirms the reality of our Lord's human nature - "homoousios with us as to his manhood". He was not an apparition, some ghostly manifestation. In Docetism, Christ becomes timeless and symbolical; His humanity is stripped of its reality and crassness - it becomes a symbolical association. "It robs the message of its whole point, namely, that God is present here in an individual man, and that he has ranged himself alongside us under the pressures of history." Chalcedon further counters Apollinarian teaching by declaring that the Logos took the fullness of humanity. For in this teaching the Logos merely took the place of (that is, did not assume) the human spirit. The union is that of the Logos permeating the human principle and at bottom there is but one nature; Christ was more divine than human; His humanity was incomplete. Nestorianism, also, is countered by a reference to the Theotokos: "begotten of the Father before ages as to his Godhead, and in the last days, the same, for us and our salvation, of Mary the Virgin Theotokos as to his manhood ...." Nestorianism, accused of dividing Christ into two persons, refused to call the Virgin "Theotokos", "Mother of God", whilst further denials of this position (and Eutychianism) are embodied in the statements: "without division and separation", together with the denial of two persona, by adding: "without confusion, without change" respectively.
Finally, the preservation of each nature in its entirety combat any Monophysitic, or Monothylitic strains (with respect to substance and will). Christ is to be fully human and fully divine. His humanity must not be stripped of anything fundamental to its definitive quality. Neither must his divinity be veiled by any diminutive qualification so as to render obsolete his full possession of all the attributes of deity. They must be held together, in our thinking, preaching, and praying, in hypostatic union, without transgressing the boundaries that the Church has established at such great cost.

Here, too, we have to ask the important question, which Chalcedon forces upon us, as to the communication between the two natures. Two fundamental principles have to be remembered in our theological thinking: firstly, that an act in either nature is an act in, and of, the one person. Secondly, that the intercommunication of attributes, from the one nature to the other, is a perilous notion (witness the Lutheran controversy concerning the ubiquity of the Lord's physical body in the Supper). It is primarily with this second axiom that we are concerned in this paper.

Chalcedon has given us invaluable theological service. Theological indifference in the cause of piety is simply a misunderstanding of true worship which is in spirit and in truth. Indifference to the symbol because of a notion of irrelevance only displays a shameful lack of acquaintance with the unavoidable, logical consequences of the statements: "I and my Father are one" (Jn.10.30), together with the apostolic excitement over "that which ... our hands have handled, concerning the Word of life" (1 Jn.1.1) Disparagement due to cultural distance, the dissimilarity between Greek thought and ours (both as to modes of expression and to thinking modalities themselves) is often a veiled attack on the guidelines themselves. For they have warned: No Christology may deny the unity of the person; No Christology may deny the reality and perfection of the human and divine natures; and, No Christology may compound, or confound, the two natures. These form co-ordinate truths of equal importance. We cross them at our peril, denying fundamental truths of Scripture, and dishonouring the Lord who died for our sins.

22.
Concerning the uni-personality of Christ, it became the custom of theological parlance to deny the personality (the distinct personal subsistence, or, seat of self-consciousness) of the human nature of Christ. It was, and is, anhypostatic, or impersonal. Current psychological conceptions reject the possibility of human existence without personality. Cyril of Alexandria, in contrast to Nestorian objections to Theotokos, insisted that there was no man Jesus existing independently of the Divine Logos; there was no human hypostasis or persona; the person was the Divine Son. In more recent theological discussion, anhypostasia has received critical attention, the main objections being along the line of a soteriological consideration: What Christ did not take, He could not redeem. Donald Baillie quotes H.R. MacKintosh (who wrote at the turn of this century) when he says: "If we are not to trust our intuitive perception that the Christ we read of in the Gospels is an individual man, it is hard to say what perception could be trusted." What they mean is clear: humanness involves personality; Christ is human and therefore has a personality which is human.

The objection to this lies at one of the Chalcedonian boundaries: the uni-personality of Christ. If Christ is a man (having a personal self-consciousness, a human personality), then either he has two persons (human and divine), or else he is merely tabernacling in a fully human subsistence — an Apollinarian heresy condemned by the church. The New Testament is careful, on the other hand, to speak about Jesus — in its incarnational and theological pronouncements — as a man. It is true that he was made flesh (Jn.1.14); that he was found in fashion as a man (Phil.2.7); and, that he was made in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom.8.1-4), but these are guarded theological expressions. They evidence some measure of trepidation at the level of the fully human self-consciousness of Jesus, though affirming with tenacity and conviction the "vere homo" according to his human nature.

It is to Leontius of Byzantium and John of Damascus that we owe another solution to this entire problem. It is that of enhypostasia, or, impersonality. That is, Christ is personal only in the Logos, not apart from the Logos. The
incarnation did not adopt a human person; rather, it is always the person of the human nature of the Son of God: the person of the God-man. Paradox abounds, but of necessity, for we deal with the ultimate of paradoxes: God Incarnate!; the Creator made flesh! The Ego is that of the Son of God - not the human nature alone; not the divine nature alone, but the human and the divine existing "without confusion, without change, without division, without separation." It is this person who is born. It is this person who lives. It is this person who dies. The humanness of Jesus is always the humanity of God! It is into the human face of God that Thomas confessed: "My Lord, and my God" (Jn.20.28). Hence the church's confession and obligation is always surrounded by the saying: "Feed the church of God which He hath purchased with His own blood" (Acts 20.28 Authorised Version).

It has been necessary to develop this concept of the enhypostatic union of the two natures, in order to underline the uni-personality of our Lord. In considering the suffering of Christ, having credal status: "suffered under Pontius Pilate" (Latin: Passus - though a later tradition), some difficult concepts arise. Paul speaks of those who have "crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor. 2.8), that which in Old Testament fundamental structures was Jehovah, to whom all praise and worship was given: "the Lord our God is one Lord". It is Jehovah Jesus, God incarnate, the kurios tes doxes, who was crucified. The church was conscious of her theological tradition, for we have evidence of the term kyrios being substituted for YHWH in the Septuagint, and this gave precedent for what is, according to Oscar Cullmann and others, the earliest Christian confession: "Jesus is Lord" (1 Cor.12.3). Thus there are texts from the Old Testament which referred to Yahweh, now applied unequivocably to Christ. Paul refers salvation to the Lord, having allusion to Joel 2.32, and now to Jesus (Rom 10.13). Creation is ascribed to Jesus, by quoting Psalm 102.25-27 the writer to the Hebrews correlates the Lord of the Psalmist with Christ himself (Heb.1.10; cf Jude 14f; Rev.17.14;19.16; Phil.2.9-11). 7 Jesus knew that he must suffer (pathein) and be rejected (Mk.8.31), and be condemned to death (Mk.10.33); be killed (Mk.8.31); be
mocked, scourged, and spat upon (Mk. 10.34). And in combined action of abandonment to the cross, the Scriptures capture it all in the phrase: "they crucified him" (Lk. 23.33). The troubled heart (Jn. 12.27), of that dark moment of redemptive history, was all in anticipation of that time when the earth shook, and the rocks were split, and bodies of the saints were raised (Matt. 27.52f). The mystery of that dereliction is not least expressed in the confession of the bewildered centurion: "Truly this was the Son of God" (Matt. 27.54).

In the apostolic preaching, Peter speaks of this "Jesus whom ye have crucified" (Acts 4.10). However, it is in Pauline theology that the paradox is acute. Jesus is described as the one who, being in the form of God, died the death of the cross (Phil. 2.5-11). It is the pre-existent, now incarnate, Lord who dies. He did not count his equality with God a thing to be grasped at, or held on to greedily (taking the harpagmos as a res rapta), but humbled himself, and in so doing, veiling his glory, he was in the form of a servant.³

Perhaps it is Johannine Christology which, after all, expresses this thought with peculiar force. The modern versions have seen the problem and excised the difficulty by way of a "smoother" translation. The King James reading of 1 Jn. 3.16 abounds with the problem we are considering: "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us."

The reluctance of the Scriptures to speak of the involvement of God, personally, in the atonement is reflected to some degree in the church's later handling of Christology, mainly for fear of its implications, and a lack of confidence in handling the notion of pathos in God.⁹ Ignatius, Clement of Rome, Melito and others speak mildly concerning the "suffering of God", "the blood of God", and such terms.¹⁰ It is mild and careful in comparison to Modalistic Monarchianism.¹¹ According to Hippolytus, Noetus taught that if Christ is God, he is surely the Father, or else not God; therefore if Christ suffered, then God suffered.

The Father and the son so-called are one and the
same. ... One was He who appeared and underwent
birth from a Virgin and dwelt as a man among men
.... He also suffered, being nailed to the tree,
and gave up His spirit to Himself, and died and did
not die. 12

Tertullian, a vigorous enemy of Patriperassionism, sees
a solution in that God's feelings are qualitatively
different from our own. God is apatheia. It is in Alex-
andria that impassibility becomes fully mature. Clement
insists that God is free from anything emotional, whilst
Origen speaks of God as "wholly impassible", emotional lan-
guage in the Bible being totally ascribed to allegoriza-
tion. 13

The anathema appended to the Nicene Creed warns against
"those who say .... that the Son of God .... is subject
to alteration (treptos) or change (alloiotos)" in connection
with the homousios to patri dogma. Gregory of
Naziansus poses the solution: "passible in His flesh; im-
passible in His Godhead." 14 Calvin insists, in connection
with Acts 20.28: "Surely God does not have blood, does not
suffer, cannot be touched with hands." 15 It is clear that
history does not help a great deal in this case. We are
driven back to the boundaries of Chalcedon. They prove
their inestimable wealth in this.

Mention ought also to be made concerning Stephen Char-
nock's Discourses on the Existence and Attributes of God.16
He uses the via negativa hermeneutic in discussing the
attributes of God. God's perfection, therefore, is due to
His lack of limitations, together with His being in a state
of perfection as to positive qualities (via eminentiae). 17
After having described God as unchangeable in His essence,
knowledge, will, purpose' and place (p.319-30), he goes on
to give six reasons for God's immutability (p.331-5). Follow-
ing a brief discussion of the intransferability of
this attribute, he opines an anti-kenotic notion that the
divine nature of Christ remained immutable during the in-
carnation. However, he can say:

His blood while it was pouring out of his veins was
"blood of God". 18

26.
Gerald Wondra, in an article called "The Pathos of God" objects vehemently that Charnock is governed by a neo-Platonic definition of God:

To say that an impassible divine nature was present in Christ during his suffering would, to the writer of the Hebrews, sound like sheer nonsense. \(^{19}\)

He says this because Charnock is forced into a separation of the two natures. This Nestorian tendency is always present, involving the attribute of impassibility in the divine, but not in the human. Charnock, in turn, has done this, of course, by a consideration of the doctrine of God proper, but what do we really make of a passage like Hosea 11.7-9? "My people are bent on turning away from me; so they are appointed to the yoke, and none shall remove it. How can I give you up, O Ephraim! How can I hand you over, O Israel! .... My heart recoils within me, my compassion grows warm and tender. I will not execute my fierce anger, I will not again destroy Ephraim; ...." We are at the most difficult of boundaries: the repentance of God; the suffering of God; the pleading of God; but, anthropomorphic language as it may be, to say it is a mere condescension to the human mode of expression would be to eviscerate the dynamic of Biblical language. Is there not a sense in which emotion, at least controlled emotion (note it is "worldly passions" that are condemned, cf Titus 2.13), is part of the Imago Dei, and therefore properly in God?

There seem to be several motives governing this Christological problem, mainly due to predelictions about the doctrine of God proper. In favour of impassibility is the general notion of divine transcendence. Anthropomorphisms no longer threaten the transcendent One. However, this loses all its force when we consider Barth, or Brunner, who, being guided by the totaliter alter doctrine, deny any such notion of impassibility. Yet another reason (pro-impassibility) is along Augustine's notion of Pathos as "a movement of the mind contrary to reason." \(^{20}\) Perfection of blessedness demands impassibility on that account.

Another argument (linked with the first) is the sheer dread of anthropomorphisms.
Repentance is not properly in God. He is a pure Spirit, and is not capable of those passions which are signs of weakness and ignorance ... No proper grief can be imagined to be in God: as repentance is inconsistent with infallible foresight, so is grief no less inconsistent with undefiled blessedness. 21

On the other hand, is the love of God real if it is emotionless? Is it possible for agape to mean one thing in a marriage setting (Eph. 5.28), and another in God's love for the world (Jn. 3.16)? Johannine Christology declares the wondrous truth that the pre-existent, pre-incarnate Logos was with (or towards: pros not sun) God (Jn. 1.1, 2). Is this not a divine movement of the Son towards the Father? John is giving expression not only to ontology and pre-existence, but to mutual, non-static love between the Father and the Son. This mutual enjoyment of the Divine presence must be emotional in some sense of the word. It sees its zenith and most poignant expression in the cry of dereliction from the cross, when the intimacy of Divine communion was withdrawn, and in utter self-abandonment to the Father's wrath the Son was heard to cry: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matt. 27.46). This Divine separation, when "the Judge is judged" (Barth 22 ), cannot be of mere cerebral, impassible expression.

What we have seen so far is the Nestorian tendency in much Christological writing, even in the Reformed tradition, ascribing passibility to the human nature alone, and in effect denying Chalcedon's boundary of the uni-personality of Christ. The doctrine of God proper, by reason of our trinitarianism, needs careful thought in the light of the cross, remembering that the cross is not, and cannot be loved, for it is the place of the divine abandonment of Jehovah-Jesus.

Two other concerns seem to surface in this century to combat impassibility. Firstly, the suffering of the world suggests the suffering of God (Moltmann). Secondly, the cross points backwards to pre-existence, revealing God's eternal nature. According to Barth, the experience of the passion of Christ reveals "the final depth of the being 28.
In 1926, J.K. Mozley posed six questions—questions which do not seem to have been fully answered as yet. We list them here for our convenience:

1. What do we imply by the term God (as personal)?
2. What is God's relationship to the world (transcendence and immanence)?
3. What is the relation of God to time?
4. Is feeling in God related at all to our feeling?
5. Would the fact of God's impassibility better secure the highest values which man desires of the universe?
6. What is the relation of the cross to eternity?

Some of these questions are more important than others; the answer to each is dependent upon the axiom: through God alone can God be known. The doctrine of God can only be known by revelation—the revelation of the divine name. It requires personal revelation through time. It is "a vertical message from above" (Barth). To the question of "how?" concerning the two natures, Brunner gives a reminder that the New Testament gives no answer.

It was enough (for the apostles) to know that He is both true God and also true Man, not only from the physical but from the mental and spiritual point of view, in no way absolute, unlimited, all-knowing, all-mighty, but a weak man, who suffers, is hungry, one who has tasted the depths of human anguish and despair; in brief, a human being, whom it is only natural to regard as a mere human being.

And thus there is no need to speak of human nature suffering in abstraction from the divine, for "the human element, in the deepest sense of the word constitutes the material for this sacrifice; therefore it must be suffered in a truly human way. But this can only be achieved by God Himself; therefore the person who thus acts, the person in whom the human nature truly suffers, must be the divine person." Brunner is cautious, forbidding any notion of divine suffering per se. It is still the anguish of the Person. If God does not in any sense share my sufferings as I seek to bear them with courage and fortitude; if God
is wholly and totally impassible, having no empathy with us, except via the human nature of Christ, then does not the cross, precious as it is, lose some of its profoundest meaning? He, who was made a little lower than the angels for a little while, knew suffering — that of death — by the grace of God, in order that He might taste death for every man (Heb. 2.9).

As this affects the doctrine of God, it is being raised in all quarters today. Thus, the Roman Catholic theologian, Karl Rahner, can say: "The death of Jesus is a statement of God about himself." Is there a sense of identity in the suffering of God and of Jesus? Who is God: the one who lets Jesus die, or, at the same time, the Jesus who dies? So much of our thinking is tri-theistic at this point. There is God the Father; there is God the Son who is involved in the Incarnation and self-abnegation — but there is only one God (Deut. 6.4). It is for this reason that Moltmann can say:

God is not greater than he is in this humiliation.
God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine than he is in this humanity.

Surely there is an awesome problem here. Trinitarianism must constantly maintain the absconditus nature of the Divine Being. Even during the Incarnation God is veiled. He is in heaven as well as upon earth. There is an extra to the Incarnation, but not such that we are left with kenosis or tritheism. Scripture makes a distinction between the Father and the Son. It is the Son who is made flesh (Jn. 1.14), who takes the very nature of a servant (Phil. 2.7), who appears in a body (1 Tim. 3.16f). There is one God; one ousia; one hypostasis; but three individual subsistences: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Divine essence is generically, and numerically, one. Can we really avoid (that is, logically) a trinitarian concept of the Incarnation? The human nature of Christ relates to the Godhead in two ways: to the divine nature of Christ, as well as to the divine nature in general (for they cannot be separated). Is it not bound up with such statements as "God the Mighty Maker died"? The homoousios demands some such
notion. Anything less than this is Docetism. And yet, who can understand this? Omniscent and ignorant; infinite and finite; God and less than God; Creator and the man of sorrows - all of this in the one Person. It is quintessentially paradoxical, and the church's only hope. This, in part at least, is the pitfall (and the motive at the same time!) of kenotic Christology, for "the theistic concept of God according to which God cannot die, and the hope for salvation, according to which man is to be immortal, made it impossible to regard Jesus as really being God and at the same time as being forsaken by God."\[31\]

Passibility, the suffering of God, needs careful definition. O.C. Quick has distinguished three kinds: external, internal, and sensational.\[32\] "External" passibility refers to the relations of a being towards that which is beyond or outside itself. It is the capacity to be influenced from outside. In the creation, God voluntarily limited Himself so as to allow free agency and even rebellion in man. God is absolutely, or ultimately, impassible, though he becomes relatively possible by His own voluntary act of creation.

"Internal" passibility refers to relations within a conscious being, or personality. It is here that we come across those whims and fancies that are contrary to reason and judgement, but part of our fickle and fallen nature.\[33\] God is the Father of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change (James 1.17). Finally, Quick distinguishes a third type of passibility, to which he gives the name: "sensational". It is intermediate between "internal" and "external", being liable to pleasure, pain, "and more especially, those (sensations) of pain, which are caused within a conscious being by the action of some other being upon it."\[34\] It is part of that victorious activity whereby He ultimately subdues all things unto Himself. Thus, in the creation, God was manifest as "externally" possible, but in the God-man, there is no external relation between God and man. That which has come into being in Him is Life, and the Life is the light of men (cf Jn.1.3). Here John is asserting that in Jesus Christ someone was born into the world who was in a new relation to the eternal Word; it was not through Him, but actually in Him (en auto) in hypostatic union.
Nevertheless, the humanity (or manhood) of Jesus is the self-expression of Godhead within the world; it is the humanity of God - undergoing the curse for us (Gal.3.13; 4.4), and revealing further passibility in that He became a man of like passions, yet without sin (Heb.4.15). How far can we go? When the apostle speaks of God having "delivered up" (papadidomai, Rom.8.32; cf Rom.1.18ff where it means to cast out, kill, give up, or abandon) His own Son, there is the language of the curse used. There is a God-forsakeness in Christ, that we might have life. But, clearly, we shudder when we read of an act whereby "the first Person casts out and annihilates the second." Moltmann wants to see in the cross, where there is a "giving Himself for me" (Gal.2.20), a deep separatedness in the act of being forsaken; a unity in their surrender: The Father's deliverance and the Son's acceptance. It is not death of, but death in God.

In a chapter entitled: "The way of the Son of God into the far country", Karl Barth speaks of "flesh" as being in a state of perishing before God. This is the state of Christ for us. He takes the place of Israel's sufferings. "His history must be a history of suffering".

In Him God has entered in, breaking into that circulus vitiosus of the human plight, making His own not only guilt of man but also his rejection and condemnation, giving Himself to bear the divinely righteous consequences of human sin, not merely affirming the divine sentence on man, but allowing it to be fulfilled on Himself. He, the electing, eternal God, willed Himself to be rejected and therefore perishing man ....

And more explicitly, he says:

It is God Himself who takes the place of the former sufferers and allows the bitterness of suffering to fall upon Himself.

Barth insists that "God Himself" is in Christ (2 Cor. 5.19). He is God: Jesus is Jehovah. He is the depository and self-revelation of this "God Himself". The motive is an anti-kenotic one. The paradox cannot be avoided, how-
ever hard we try, and so "the Almighty exists and acts and speaks here in the form of One who is weak and impotent, the eternal as One who is temporal and perishing, the Most High in the deepest humility." 40

Forseeing the charge of blasphemy that is ever close at hand at this point, Barth goes on to say that God does not alter Himself, but rather denies "the immutability of His being, His divine nature, to be in discontinuity with Himself, to be against Himself, to set Himself in self-contradiction." 41 Barth can live with this since his theological system is governed by the notion of paradox. It is dialectic. But, it would be better to contemplating Quick's definition, allowing for "sensational" passions. There would be no need to speak of a denial of immutability (which means an annihilation of God, the Second Person); the Deus absconditus is still retained.

In an attempt to reconcile these statements, Barth brings in the dialectical hermeneutic once more and says:

God gives Himself, but does not give Himself away ... He does not cease to be God. He does not come into conflict with Himself ... He acts as Lord over this contradiction even as He subjects Himself to it. He frees the creature in becoming the creature. He overcomes the flesh in becoming flesh. He reconciles the world with Himself as He is in Christ. 42

How do we do justice to the death of one "in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily"? (Col.2.9). At stake here is the preaching of the church ... "Feed the church of God" (Acts 20.28), and at its very heart lies mystery. We can speak too clearly about some things, and in our attempt to be clear miss the very heart of the matter. There is no Trinitarian incarnation; God cannot deny Himself (2 Tim.2.13), but we dare not retreat to impassibility but ever cling to the ultimate boundary of the New Testament kerygma, that the Lord of glory was crucified (1 Cor. 2.7,8; cf 2 Cor.5.19), and this indissoluble "mystery" (1Tim.3.16): the giving of Himself for me. In an age of violence and murder, injustice and cruelty, it is the church's most poignant sanctuary.
FOOTNOTES


2. c.f. Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (London: SCM Press, 1974). "To take up the theology of the Cross today is to go beyond the limits of the doctrine of salvation and to inquire into the revolution needed in the concept of God. Who is God in the cross of the Christ who is abandoned by God?" p.4


4. See the discussion in D.M.Baillie, God was in Christ (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1948), p.85f

5. Ibid. p.86

6. ton kupion tes doxes estauposan


8. We cannot handle all the exegetical difficulties of this text at this point; it is the thought of Calvin and John Owen that is mainly expressed.


10. Ibid. p.7

11. There are two forms of Monarchianism: Adoptionist, Dynamic Monarchianism, where the person of Jesus is thought to be a man, divinely energised by the Holy Spirit to become the Son of God (so, Theodotus of Byzantium, Paul of Samosata, the Ebionites); it is this which is condemned in 1 Jn.5.6. And, again, Modalistic Monarchianism (or Patrpossionism, or Sabellianism), as represented by Noetus, Praxeas and Sabellius in Rome, arising in the second and third centuries. They speak of God appearing in different forms and modes and at different times, maintaining the divinity of the Son, and the unity of God at the same time.
12. Noetus; quoted by Mozley, op.cit.p.29
13. Ibid. p.29
14. Ibid. p.87
16. (New York: Wilber B. Ketcham, 1846), Vol 1
17. Ibid. p.300f
18. Ibid. p.340
19. The Reformed Review, Vol 18, No.2 (Dec 1964), pp 28–35. Wondra is exaggerated in his denunciation, but we think Berkhof is right when he calls the methodology improper for Dogmatics. Its starting point is man-centered, and not theocentric, not being based on the Divine self-disclosure. See, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth, 1971) p.52f
20. Mozely, op.cit. p.104
21. Charnock, op.cit.,p.338. Anthropomorphisms show what God would be like were He capable of emotions, he claims.
22. Or, as Moltmann puts it: "The Cross is not, and cannot be loved." Ibid.p.1
23. Church Dogmatics, II/1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1961) p.588
26. Ibid. p.345
27. Ibid. p.502
28. Theological Investigations IV (Darton: Longman & Todd, 1966) p.113
30. This, Charles Hodge allows; see Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), Vol II p.393

31. Moltmann, op.cit. p.227


33. It is that to which Paul and Barnabas refer at Lystra, in that God is not like Zeus or Hermes, who, being whimsical, are no gods at all (Acts 14.15). This is the Scriptural warrant of the Westminster Confession's statement that God is "without parts or passions", (II/I). We can readily assent to this, given the context of Acts 14, and taking Quick's distinction as to "internal" passions; cf Kenneth J.Woollcombe, "The Pain of God", The Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol 20 (1967) pp.129-148. The Old Testament is full of references to God's involvement in human life; the pain felt by the Spirit (Is.63.10); the empathy with His people's afflictions (Is.63.9), etc. The New Testament, too, speaks of the inner mercies of God (Lk.1.78). It is the predeliction of the story of Jonah; the compassion of the Father in the parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk.15). It is that, most vividly expressed, to which the Hebrew מַעַן refers, of a woman's yearning for the fruit of her womb (Is.13.18), and the love of God for His people (Ex.33.19; Deut. 13.18 etc). See F.Brown, S.R.Driver and C.A.Briggs, A Hebrew & English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975) p.933

34. Op.cit. p.185

35. Op.cit. p.241, cf 2 Cor.5.21; Gal.3.13. Moltmann is not guilty of Patrispassionism. He coins instead the word Patri-compassionism (p.276), for he insists that "the suffering and dying of the Son, forsaken by the Father, is a different kind of suffering from the suffering of the Father in the death of the Son" p.243


38. Ibid.

39. Barth says: "God is always God even in His humiliation. The divine being does not suffer any change, any diminution, any transformation into something else, let alone any cessation. The deity of Christ is one unaltered, because unalterable, deity of God. Any subtraction or weakening of it would at once throw doubt upon the atonement made by Him." Ibid. pp.179-80

40. Ibid. p.176

41. Ibid. p.184

42. Ibid. p.185

SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF OLD TESTAMENT STUDY

Rev Stephen Dray MA BD

THE LAST ten years or so has seen, both in liberal and conservative circles, a renewed interest in the Old Testament and its message. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to some of the most significant volumes that have appeared in this period, especially works which may be described as general or introductory in character. We begin with the consideration of a major contribution to the study of the Old Testament text.

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