26 June 2025

Faith and Reason: Reflections on Theistic Proofs

Abstract

When considering the nature and purpose of arguments for the existence of God, much depends on those for whom the particular argument is intended and what it is designed to achieve. Moreover, we must address the question of the legitimacy and validity of such an argument. This paper explores the classic theistic proofs – particularly those of Aquinas and Anselm – and evaluates their strengths and limitations in establishing the existence and identity of God. It argues that while a posteriori arguments (like Aquinas’s Five Ways and modern design arguments) may suggest the existence of a supreme being, they cannot reveal the triune God of Christian revelation. Likewise, a priori arguments (such as Anselm’s ontological proof) offer rich theological reflection for believers but are not designed to persuade sceptics. Ultimately, the paper contends that God is not the conclusion of human reasoning but its starting point, and that the knowledge of God is rooted not in abstract proofs but in divine self-revelation through Scripture and the person of Christ.

A Sceptical Introduction

Modern Arguments with an Apologetic Purpose to Persuade Unbelievers

In the wake of criticisms raised in the Enlightenment, there have arisen a range of arguments intended to convince atheists or agnostics of the existence of God. Often these have proceeded from the works of God in creation. Discussion of how to approach such persons has driven considerable interest in apologetics in the USA. One well-known Christian philosopher and theologians has recalled how, the first time he travelled to America, one of the first questions put to him was “Say, what is your apologetic methodology?” Sometimes I wonder about the extent to which those obsessed by apologetics have hands-on experience. In this paper, I do not intend to discuss these arguments in any detail. However, at the end of the paper, we will consider a better way.

As is well known, the Bible never attempts to prove that God exists. Those who say ‘there is no God’ are classed as fools (Ps 14:1, 53:1). Behind this lie some excellent reasons.

First, the premises of an argument have greater certainty than the conclusion to which the argument attempts to reach.^[1] The aim would be to establish the existence of God but in order to do so a rational and reasonable discussion must proceed, at least tacitly, from commonly agreed principles, among which the intended conclusion does not feature. To enter such a discussion is to give the game away from the start.

Moreover, most arguments intend to establish that there is a supreme entity and cannot describe the nature of that entity. Alternatively, the focus is on a certain property, a supreme designer, a first cause, or the like rather than the full characteristics of that entity. As we shall see, even if such an argument were successful, the most it could establish would be the existence of a supreme entity. Such a being would be an idol, ruled out by the first commandment. It could not prove the existence of the one true and living God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In short, such a process is a blind alley.

Furthermore, since God the Trinity is personal, one can ask whether a logical argument is appropriate. Do you try to prove by logic the existence of person A, B, or C, of a friend or family member? Is it not by introduction, recognition and communion? This is personal knowledge, in which intuitive and relational modes of interaction are the distinguishing markers. We will return to this later. For now, as the composer Verdi remarked in a letter to Francesco Florimo on 5 January 1871, “Let us return to antiquity; it will be a step forward.”^[2]

Thomas Aquinas Enters the Stage

At the start of his Summa theologica, Aquinas (1225-1274) refers to various types of arguments to establish the existence of God. On the question of whether it can be demonstrated that God exists, in ST 1.2.2., in the sed contra section, he argues against the proposal that God’s existence cannot be demonstrated and in favour of its being possible. He refers to Romans 1:19-20 as establishing his point. He suggests that demonstration can be done in two ways: a priori, from what is prior absolutely, and a posteriori, from what is prior relatively, only to us, from those of his effects that are known to us back to their cause. These alternatives are preambles to the articles of faith and are known by reason; therefore, they are not themselves articles of faith. Since the effects are not proportionate to the cause, we cannot, by this means, know God perfectly as he is in his essence. Yet his existence can be clearly demonstrated, so Aquinas maintains.

 A posteriori Arguments

The Five Ways

In ST 1.2.3., ‘Whether God exists?’ Aquinas argues that the existence of God can be proved in five ways.

First, Aquinas presents the argument from motion, or change. It is certain, and is evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another. Motion is nothing other than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. Nothing can be put in a state of actuality other than by something that is itself in a state of actuality. Fire is actually hot and brings wood, which is potentially hot, into a state of being actually hot. Therefore whatever is in motion is put in motion by another. Craig comments that what is meant is that: “Anything in change is being actualized by a being already actual,” not a potential being. Thus, “anything changing cannot at the point at which it is changing cause itself to change. It must be shaped by something else … this something else, if it is in a process of change, is also being changed by something else, and so on.”^[3] But this cannot go on to infinity, Aquinas continues, since unless there were a first cause of motion there could be no subsequent motion. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other. And this first mover is God. Brian Davies summarises pithily, “There must be something which causes change or motion in things without itself being changed or moved by anything.”^[4] Aquinas has the same argument in his Summa contra Gentiles, 1:13. It is based on Aristotle, Physics, 8:5, who states that no infinite regression is possible, “we must reach one first cause – God.”^[5] This is what is known as God – as the unmoved mover.^[6]

The second way is closely related and is based on causality; in particular the nature of the efficient causes. In the world of sense we find that there is an order of efficient causes. Davies, in discussing causality, refers to grandparents, who cause the birth of grandchildren via the production of their children even though they have no immediate connection with the birth of the grandchildren and may even be dead at the time, whereas the statue of Nelson is supported by the column underneath at all times and so is the cause of Nelson remaining in place. Thus, “in the five ways, God is not a cause who at some time past set a process going which then in time had certain effects. He is the cause of effects which depend on him as they occur.”^[7] Aquinas continues; that it is not possible for a thing to be the efficient cause of itself, for then it would be prior to itself. It is not possible in efficient causes to go back to infinity. If there is no first cause there will be no intermediate or ultimate causes. Moreover, if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity there would be no intermediate or ultimate causes. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, “something which is not itself caused to be by anything,”^[8] which is God.

The third way is taken from what Aquinas describes as possibility and necessity, which we might better understand as the difference between necessary and contingent being. In nature, Thomas writes, we find things that are possible to be and not to be [contingent, in other words]. It is impossible for these entities always to exist since at some time or other they may not be or may not have been. On the other hand, if everything were contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing. Therefore not all beings are possible [contingent]; there must exist something that is necessary, that must exist. A necessary being either exists by itself or another. It is impossible for necessary beings that exist by another to go on to infinity, as above. Therefore, there must be a being that exists necessarily and does so of itself, not from another. This is what people refer to as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Things are generally regarded as good, true, noble, and the like. In this they are measured by something that is the best. The maximum in any genus is the cause of that genus. Therefore, there must be for all beings something that is the cause of their goodness, truth, and nobility. This we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the government of the world. Things that lack intelligence are driven to fulfil their end or purpose. Evidently, they are driven to that end by a being with superior power and intelligence. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all things are directed to their end or purpose. This is God. This is a form of argument for design.

In each of these cases advanced by Aquinas, it is clear that the movement of thought is from effects in the world to the ultimate cause of those effects. Here we see the influence of Aristotle, for whom knowledge is based on sense experience. For Aquinas, “all our knowledge originates from sensory intuitions,” with the result that he favoured a posteriori arguments.^[9] We can know of God only what is evident to us through our senses, proceeding from the world to God, from effect to cause. We begin with the world in which we live.

None of these arguments can establish that the being in question is the God who has revealed himself in Scripture. To this Aquinas agreed, holding to the fact that the Trinity is revealed and is not reached by reason. As with other arguments that have developed later in response to post-Enlightenment scepticism, the best that can be established is that there is a supreme entity which has certain powers – design, government of the universe, the efficient cause of all things in creation, and is the prime mover. Each of these categories highlights certain properties of that entity, but no more. These arguments do not say anything about the nature of God, as Aquinas acknowledges; still less can they establish that the supreme entity in question is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

We need to add to these five ways, Aquinas’s existence argument, which appears throughout his work and Davies argues is fundamental to his thought.^[10] It is presented explicitly in ST 1a.65.1:

If things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be the principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual or visible and corporeal.

In his Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas refers to an argument by John of Damascus about the government of the world that is obviously similar and was also suggested by Averroes:

Contrary and discordant things cannot be parts of one order except by someone’s government which enables all and each to tend to a definite end. In the world we find things of diverse natures come together under one order, not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed. This we call God.^[11]

As Craig says, there is:

… an element of agnosticism in Aquinas’s philosophy of God. We are driven by his proofs to assert that God is, but we do not know what God is. He has no essence except his act of existing. This is why Thomas employs the via negativa in eliminating certain qualities that can not be applied to God.^[12]

He comments that there is little that is distinctive in Aquinas, since what he said had already been said by Aristotle, Maimonides, and Ibn Sira; “the principal contribution of Aquinas comes in his conception of existence as the act of being of a particular essence.” Before Aquinas existence was seen as an accident, something added to the essence of a thing, something adventitious that was not a necessary part of the thing. Aquinas denied that existence was an accident.^[13] His contribution was “a mental exposition summarizing the culmination of hundreds of years of thought.”^[14]

Reason and the Supreme Authority of Scripture

Moreover, still in Summa theologica 1:1, Aquinas acknowledged that even if such arguments were successful they would be accessible only to a few people. Additionally, over time they would be degraded by many errors. Meanwhile, he insists, our salvation depends on knowledge of the truth.^[15] Therefore, divine revelation is necessary. It is well to read this entire section:

As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences; so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor 15).

Inferior sciences leave the proof of their principles to a higher science, but the highest science, metaphysics, disputes with those who deny its principles only if its opponents make some concession. Otherwise, it answers objections.

Hence Sacred Scripture … can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation… If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections – if he has any – against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations but are difficulties that can be answered.

Since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity [citing 2 Cor 10:5].

Writing about the authority to be accorded to doctors of the church, Aquinas says:

Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epist. ad Hieron. 19:1): ‘Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe that their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem anything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.’^[16]

Most of Aquinas’s work was in biblical exposition. Together with that background, this passage should give a lie to those who have labelled him as a rationalist who brought about a split between faith and reason. It is evident that he knew the limitations of reason as well as its usefulness and necessity. Here his principial reflection on the relationship between Scripture and tradition, faith and reason, would place him in the same camp as the reformers and the members of the Westminster Assembly.

What was Aquinas Attempting to do?

It is obvious that Aquinas was living in a very different world than ours. Two basic facts need to be recognised. The first was that in thirteenth-century Europe Christianity was the unquestionably assumed foundation and bedrock for the whole of life. This can be seen in a different setting, in Aquinas’s contemporary Bracton’s De legibus et consuetinibus Angliae, the first codification of the laws and constitution of England. There Bracton based the responsibilities of the king on biblical foundations, including reference to the letters of Paul.^[17] On the other hand, these hitherto unquestioned axioms had undergone challenge from Islamic philosophers, such as Averroes and Avicenna, who were in the vanguard of interpretation of the recently rediscovered corpus of Aristotle. Some scholars, following Averroes, adopted positions at variance from the Christian faith. It has been surmised that ideas of ‘double truth’ had a certain vogue – that something could be false scientifically but true in religious terms. To Thomas, it seemed some were saying that contradictories could be simultaneously true. It had raised the question of the relationship between faith and reason. Aquinas asserted that while reason was limited and could not of itself arrive at such things as the doctrine of the Trinity, nevertheless, the Christian faith, and with it the existence of God, could be rationally explained and defended.

Aquinas was not attempting to persuade an atheist or agnostic, such as we encounter. It was a completely different world than ours. Indeed, as Davies remarks:

Aquinas is not at all worried about making out a case for God’s existence. He knows of those with no Christian faith … but he does not really doubt the reality of God. It is most unlikely that he ever encountered an atheist in the modern sense. Nor does he maintain that anyone has an obligation to weigh up the evidence for theism.^[18]

Moreover, “he thinks it perfectly proper for someone to start by taking God’s existence for granted.”^[19] He denies that God’s existence is evident to us in the way logically self-evident propositions are^[20] and, in contrast to Calvin 300 years later,^[21] he is unhappy with the idea that all people have an innate awareness of God’s existence by nature.^[22] We are therefore dependent on revelation. It is obvious that Calvin was not to deny the need for revelation but in his case, he held that there was a universal sensus divinitatis that, given the fall, expressed itself in a variety of forms of idolatry.^[23]

Later a posteriori Arguments

Robert Tad Lehe considers Stuart Hackett’s defence of the cosmological, teleological and moral arguments, inferring God’s existence from the actuality of the cosmos, its orderliness, the existence of persons and moral order.^[24] He agrees with Bernard Lonergan that all arguments for the existence of God “are included in the following general form. If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists.”^[25] This is based on the coherence theory of truth. Knowledge depends on the complete intelligibility of reality, on the adequacy to reality of a coherent system of thought. This suggests that the existence of God, who is the source of reality and the capacity to know reality, is the best explanation for the unity of thought and reality which makes knowledge possible. While this is of course true, and these assumptions have underpinned scientific investigation, it still leaves the identity of God unaddressed.

Argument From Design

Ronald Reagan, in his inimitable fashion, told this joke about atheists and design: “Sometimes when I am faced with atheists, I am tempted to invite them to the most fabulous gourmet dinner that there has ever been, and when we have finished eating that magnificent dinner, to ask them if they believe there was a cook.”^[26]

Reagan’s point is clear and carries more traction than many highly sophisticated philosophical treatises. However, the question still remains about the identity of the cook. Clearly, there is a superb chef behind the meal who can hardly remain hidden for very long, given his – or her – amazing culinary expertise. But the joke does not disclose anything of the nature of the cook; it might even have been a robot, and, with Elon Musk suggesting robots may well carry out all – or almost all – the functions humans currently do, that possibility does exist.

Kalam Cosmological Argument

The kalam cosmological argument was formulated by medieval Muslim philosophers, following the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus. It has attracted the attention of Christian apologetes in recent decades, including William Lane Craig.^[27] The argument asserts that the universe necessarily had a beginning and therefore must have had a cause. As Lawhead points out, the first step, that the universe had a beginning needs justification. Aquinas, for instance, thought it possible that the universe is co-eternal with God but dependent on him. It is revelation that states that there was a beginning.^[28] The logic of the kalam argument runs like this: 1. An actual infinite number of entities cannot exist. 2. If a series of past events does not have a beginning, there exists an infinite number of entities, therefore, 3. The universe had a beginning. This forces a finite future in addition to a finite past. Lawhead argues that if the past necessarily had a beginning then the future will necessarily have an end, whereas if the future consists of an unending series of events, it is possible for the past to consist of a beginningless series of events.^[29] In short, it claims too much. Whatever developments are suggested by Lawhead or Craig it is clear the argument cannot prove the existence of the God who has revealed himself in Scripture.

Prevost agrees with Lawhead on the failure of the kalam argument to sustain proof for the existence of the God acknowledged in classical theism.^[30] The kalam argument goes, 1. The universe is of a finite age. 2. If the infinite requires the postulation of the existence of an actual infinity of moments, such an actual infinity is impossible logically. 3. If finite, it must have been created. 4. This cause is God.^[31] The alternatives are that God is eternal and outside time (which is the classic Christian understanding) or that God is everlasting, and time is part of his being. Everything depends on the possibility or impossibility of the actual infinite. Kalam depends on the impossibility.^[32] Prevost argues that “simple conceivability or having the capacity to describe a state of affairs without any obvious logical contradiction are not sufficient techniques for proving the logical possibility of a particular state of affairs.” This applies to kalam and whether an actual infinite is possible.^[33] This seems to me to lead to a labyrinth, with Craig’s famous analogy of a library with an infinite number of books; what number should be assigned to a new acquisition to the library?

Teleological Argument

William Lane Craig advocates a teleological argument based on a plethora of material in physics and other allied disciplines. Craig asks, “How complex and sensitive a nexus of conditions must be given in order for the universe to permit the origin and evolution of intelligent life on earth.” In reality the universe was fine-tuned from the start. In passing, he deals with the hypothesis of divine design.^[34] He refers to God’s handiwork in nature, his revelation of himself to creation, “a self-disclosure which is aesthetically beautiful,” citing Psalm 19:1. The decision to believe is a matter of fiducia, referring to Romans 1:21, and concludes that, “The teleological argument … brings us more quickly to the true crisis of faith.”^[35] Again, for all its merits – and its biblical connections are appealing – the argument leaves open the identity of the God whose fine-tuned handiwork is featured.

These arguments are based on evident realities but, at best, have only partial application. They are arguments for a prime mover, a first cause, an intelligent designer, or a supreme moral agent. They refer to a supreme being or to particular properties of a supreme being, but not to the nature of that being or its identity. If successful, they stop well short of identifying the being with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. In effect, they aim to prove the existence of an idol, contrary to the first commandment.

Moreover, as we stated earlier, any argument proceeds on the basis that the agreed starting point is of greater certainty than the conclusion since the conclusion of the argument is in suspense and must be demonstrated rationally. In terms of the tacitly agreed process of the argument, this makes human axioms of greater certainty than God.

But God is not a conclusion at the end of a human argument; God is the starting point for any and all arguments. That, inter alia,^[36] is why the Bible never seeks to prove the existence of God; it assumes it. Moreover, logical argument is of lesser weight when persons are in view. More intuitive factors are involved. Recognition and communion are the means such relationships are initiated and cultivated, and they stand in no need of a lengthy or complex process of logical construction.

 A priori Arguments

We turn now to consider those arguments that do not depend on reference to external and observable realities. These are sometimes termed ‘armchair arguments,’ meaning that they are constructed and developed logically from assumed axioms. There is nothing necessarily deceptive or inadequate about such arguments as such, since all knowledge in whatever discipline can only exist on the basis of unprovable assumptions, which provide the basis and ground for all subsequent investigations and without which such investigation could not occur.^[37]

Anselm’s Ontological Proof

Most prominent among a priori arguments for the existence of God is the famous proof of Anselm, abbot of Bec in Normandy, in his Proslogion, written in 1078, sometime before his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury.

Perfect Being Theology

Katherin Rogers remarks that the Middle Ages was “the golden Age of perfect being theology, with Augustine of Hippo (354-430), Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) the most successful exponents of this method.”^[38] It was based on the premise that God is perfect and always does what is best. If this sounds speculative, one only has to think of what the denial of this assumption entails. Moreover, as Rogers indicates, this premise is taken for granted and “almost any philosopher who is talking about God is doing perfect being theology.”^[39] This is the background to Anselm’s own theology and to his discovery of “the single most discussed argument in the history of philosophy of the last thousand years,”^[40] one which over nine hundred years on is still a hot topic among philosophers and has never been successfully refuted.

Marilyn McCord Adams observes that contemporary philosophers, as well as Augustine, “see themselves as responding to pressure from outside to defend the rationality of Christian faith… St. Anselm’s eleventh-century situation was different.” Most of his life was spent in the Benedictine monastery at Bec. He wrote for, and at the request of, his fellow monks, in pursuit of their common aim, to see and enjoy God.^[41]

Anselm’s work was rooted in service to God and the church. In De Incarnatione Verbi written to Pope Urban II after he had become Archbishop of Canterbury, he stated:

No Christian ought to argue how things that the Catholic Church sincerely believes and verbally professes are not so, but by always adhering to the same faith without hesitation, by loving it, and by humbly living according to it, a Christian ought to argue how they are, inasmuch as one can look for reasons. If one can understand, one should thank God; if one cannot, one should bow one’s head in veneration.^[42]

Anselm’s Argument in the Proslogion

Anselm, in his Monologion, rehearsed a range of arguments relating to the nature of God but ended up dissatisfied. He acknowledged the impact of Augustine on his thought, especially from the treatise De Trinitate.^[43] One of the questions that arose for Anselm was from his commitment to perfect being theology. It necessitated an answer that would say what the perfect being is like.^[44] Anselm held that this required asking about things applying to God independently of his works, things that would apply to God if only he existed.^[45] He proposed “that there is some one thing through which all good things whatsoever are good…” and that therefore “that through which all things are good is a great good…” and “this thing alone is good through itself.”^[46] However, he detected a lack of cohesion and coherence and felt a pressing need for a single argument to establish God’s existence, “one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself.”^[47]

There followed a period of intense struggle for Anselm. His biographer, Eadmer, writing in 1124, described the difficulties he underwent: his lack of sleep, his loss of appetite, and his intense struggles against temptation.

He also wrote one book, which he called Monologion: in it he speaks in no other way than to prove the existence of God by reason alone, apart from the authority of holy Scripture, After this, it entered his mind to examine and prove what is believed and proclaimed about God by one single argument: that is, that he is eternal, immutable, omnipotent, omnipresent, incomprehensible, just, holy, merciful, truthful, reliable, good, just, and not a few other things, and in what way all these attributes are in himself one. In which matter he himself related how he had great difficulty in bringing it to birth. For, in pursuing these thoughts, he deprived himself of food and drink, and went without sleep; he was weighed down, and this affected him in the early morning and other services he was responsible to direct, due to his troubled and agitated mind … tempted by the devil, nothing would deter him from his intention.^[48]

Eventually, the torture ended. At long last, he found the argument. It was revealed to him. Great was the rejoicing among his fellow monks.

And look! By night, during the nocturnal vigils, by the grace of God shining in his heart, the matter became clear to his mind. Immense rejoicing and jubilation filled all his closest friends.^[49]

The result was the Proslogion.

In the Preface he wrote that he intended “to prove whatever we believe about the divine being”^[50] and to do so “from the point of view of one trying to raise his mind to contemplate God and seeking to understand what he believes.”^[51] In short, this was written for believers, specifically his fellow monks, as an exercise in understanding the faith they already had. He began with prayer to the God whose existence he is attempting to prove by reasoned argument. The final section rehearses the attributes of God, unfolding the nature of God in an atmosphere of praise and worship, and of application. It is not a work of apologetics in the modern sense; it is not aimed at convincing an atheist (were there any?). Indeed, while working through his proof he talks to God. Rather, he was seeking to establish the rationality of faith, which was already present and came from elsewhere, founded on other grounds.

Here we need to understand what exactly is meant by ‘proof.’ In this context, it derives from the verb probo which means, inter alia, ‘to examine, to put to the test.’^[52] It is not intended as a mathematical or logical proof. It is more a closely reasoned examination of the rational grounds for belief in the God in whom Anselm, his monks, and Christians in general trust. As Barth comments it is more accurately described as intelligere, to understand, with the result that “the validity of certain propositions advocated by Anselm is established over against those who doubt or deny them.”^[53]

Here is the main thread of Anselm’s argument.

In Proslogion, 1, he addresses God in prayer. “Come then, Lord my God, and teach my heart where and how to seek you, where and how to find you.”^[54] With intense prayer he bemoans the Fall and the limitations it imposed.^[55] He says:

But I do desire to understand your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that ‘unless I believe, I shall not understand (Isa 7:9).^[56]

As Adams states, God is his primary teacher. God makes the first move, giving uprightness of will, inclination for good.^[57] This is “a prayer exercise for believers.” The soul speaks to God. God illumines the soul. Understanding is gained, “a mean between faith and sight.”^[58]

Proslogion, 2 starts again with prayer, “Well then, Lord, you who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may understand, as much as you see fit, that you exist as we believe you to exist, and that you are as we believe you to be.” And then, immediately, Anselm addresses God in terms of the name he had revealed to him. “Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought [STWNGCBT or TTWNGCBT].”^[59]

This is the key to grasping the significance of what Anselm goes on to write. God is STWNGCBT. Some might object to Anselm seemingly conjuring out of thin air a description of God such as this and using it as the basis for his subsequent argument. However, whatever its inadequacy might be perceived to be, its denial has to be ruled out of court. Is there some entity that can be thought to exist that is greater than God? Even the fool mentioned in the Psalms, Anselm continues, knows what is meant by STWNGCBT, even if in his mind he does not understand that it exists. So, Anselm reasons, there is universal recognition of what this means. Moreover, one suggests, it could be said to sum up the biblical revelation of the uniqueness of God, his incomparability, mentioned many times in Isaiah and reiterated in the New Testament. It goes beyond God being the greatest entity ever conceived by humans or the greatest that it is ever possible to conceive. It means he is entirely independent of whether humans do or do not so conceive of him.^[60]

Anselm advances the argument; that perfection entails existence. “It is one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists.”^[61] He realises the obvious point that because we can form a mental image of a thing, it does not follow that the thing thus conceived actually exists. He provides an example of a painter who visualises the painting he is planning on producing but knows that as yet it does not exist until he has executed it. Even the Fool can agree that the idea of STWNGCBT exists in the mind; it is, after all, something concerning which he denies actuality.

Still in Proslogion, 2 Anselm proceeds to assert that STWNGCBT cannot exist in the mind alone. This is since if it existed in the mind but not in reality it would not be STWNGCBT, since if it existed in reality also it would be greater. And this is greater than existing solely in the mind:

If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality.^[62]

This is a huge step in Anselm’s case. He argues that if STWNGCBT is purely a mental concept it is not STWNGCBT since existence in reality is greater than existence merely in the mind.

That leads us further, into Proslogion, 3. Not only existence is entailed; necessary existence follows. Anselm immediately states, “And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot even be thought not to exist.”^[63] STWNGCBT must exist necessarily, in such a manner that it is impossible that it does not exist. If it was possible for it not to exist, or to move out of existence, then it could not be STWNGCBT:

For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Hence, if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to exist, then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not the same as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is absurd.^[64]

Something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought must not only exist but cannot be thought not to exist. So, Anselm concludes:

Something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists so truly then, that it cannot be even thought not to exist … And you, O Lord God, are this being. You exist so truly, Lord my God, that you cannot even be thought not to exist… Everything else there is, except you alone, can be thought of as not existing.^[65]

Davies summarises the argument:

We can think of something existing that cannot be thought not to exist.
Such a thing would be greater than something that can be thought not to exist.
So, something than which nothing greater can be thought of cannot be something that can be thought not to exist.
So, something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought not to exist.^[66]

Anselm is above all seeking to demonstrate that something existing only in the mind and /or which might fail to exist is not something TWNGCBT. In fact, “God is first of all in reality, then following from that … exists, then as a consequence of that … can be thought.”^[67] There is no greater entity possible, nor can one possibly be conceived to be.

Anselm moves on to argue in Proslogion, 5 that God is whatever is better to be than not to be and that, existing through himself alone, he makes all other beings from nothing.^[68]

Leftow comments that in the Monologion, Anselm sought arguments that “the best actual being is in its best possible state”. The Proslogion goes “even a bit further, arguing that the best possible being is in its best possible state” (Pros. 5). To do this Anselm “compares thinkable (roughly, possible) states of God.” For instance, he writes “What then are you, Lord God, that than which nothing greater can be described? … the greatest of all things … who made all other things from nothing. For whatever is not this is less than can be described. But this cannot be thought of you.”^[69]

Further, in Proslogion, 15 he concludes:

Therefore, Lord, you are not only that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought but you are also something greater than can be thought. For since it is possible to think that there is such a one, then, if you are not this same being something greater than you could be thought – which cannot be.^[70]

The Sequel

Objections by Gaunilo (a Christian playing the part of the fool) and, later, Kant do not touch the argument. Gaunilo, playing devil’s advocate, pointed to the idea of a perfect island, Kant to six hundred thalers in one’s pocket. In neither case could a mere idea of a thing prove the existence of the thing. Therefore Anselm’s argument was invalid since the idea of STWNGCBT could not establish the actual existence of STWNGCBT. However, both missed Anselm’s point that, while the existence of this or that thing in the creation is contingent, dependent entirely on God for its existence and continuation, God is necessary. By Anselm’s definition, he cannot be classed with other entities and is therefore not subject to the conditionality that is entailed in their own existence.

Aquinas’s objections seem more pertinent. He wrote:

Perhaps not everyone who hears this word ‘God’ understands it to signify ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought,’ seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that what everyone understands by this word ‘God’ is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not follow that he understands that what that word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it is admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.^[71]

That may be so but Anselm did not intend the argument for an apologetic purpose, given that those who came into this category are described in the Psalms as fools. Aquinas added that while the existence of truth in general is self-evident, the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.^[72] However, while Anselm clearly understood that no one can come to the faith by a process of reasoning alone, he allowed for the fact that some may be convinced by such methods.^[73] It would seem that it could have an effect among theists, who accept the basic premise of the supremacy of God. Moreover, if we consider the entire treatise, Anselm urges his readers to live lives that reflect what they believe, bursting into praise and gratitude to God as he does. In this way it can fulfil his intention to advance faith through understanding.^[74]

Here is a clash between Anselm, influenced indirectly by Platonic thought through his reading of, and allegiance to, Augustine,^[75] and Aquinas’s reliance on Aristotle, for whom sense experience was foundational. It seems to me that some form of philosophical realism is needed to appreciate Anselm’s argument. Given those assumptions, it can function effectively.

Certainly, it is still a hot topic among philosophers well over nine hundred years later. Neither disproved nor definitively established, it endures. Furthermore, it has the power to generate further thought; a great work of art can engender a seemingly endless trail of derivative work. The last few years have seen the construction of numerous ontological arguments.

Ontological Proofs

Miroslav Szatkowski mentions that over nine hundred years after Anselm, ontological arguments are at the forefront of recent philosophical debate.^[76] Tyron Goldschmidt points out that in ontological arguments the premises are supposed to be known a priori. They are either analytically true – true in virtue of definitions and concepts – or necessarily true, true no matter how the world might have differed. In this, they contrast with cosmological arguments and design arguments. Both of these appeal to empirical evidence about the beginning of the universe and natural laws; these are more hostage to scientific discovery.^[77] While ontological arguments seek to prove that there is a greatest conceivable being, answering the question as to why there is anything at all, a posteriori arguments focus on one divine property or attribute. Ujin Nagasawa and Alvin Plantinga are notable exponents of ontological arguments. Plantinga has written, “I do not believe that any philosopher has ever given a cogent refutation of the ontological argument in its various forms.”^[78].

Even with that in mind, it is well to heed the comment of Daniel Dennett, “Even if a Being greater than which nothing can be conceived has to exist … it is a long haul from that specification to a Being that is merciful or just or loving – unless you make sure to define it that way from the outset.”^[79]

Given the effective stalemate over Anselm’s argument, together with conundrums such as the relationship between the sovereignty and love of God over against evil, some philosophers have advanced the idea of a being that is maximally excellent rather than perfect. Plantinga suggests the following three premises:

There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world.
Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world.^[80]

As Goldschmidt observes, the crucial point here is the possibility premise. For Plantinga the only question of interest is if it is true. He says he thinks it is true but there is nothing much more to say than that. If something appears to be the case, it is possible (whether it actually is the case). But what of situations where something that appears to be the case turns out not to be the case or could not possibly be the case?^[81]

In fact, Plantinga was not out to prove the truth of theism but rather its rational acceptability.^[82] He insists his premise is rational. What it establishes is that theism is about as rational and respectable as any controversial philosophical view. The possibility of maximal greatness entails the possibility of necessary existence, which quite quickly entails existence. So, the argument does not say explicitly that God exists but “it so nearly does.” The acceptance of the premise depends on the prior acceptance of the conclusion.^[83] It is obvious to me that it presents a god who is necessarily less than the biblical God, clearly not STWNGCBT.

Yujin Nagasawa^[84]

Yujin Nagasawa defends perfect being theology but at the expense of abandoning the perfect. In practice he supports the maximal God thesis. He warns that perfect being theists should avoid Anselm’s definition of TTWNGCBT and instead argue the maximal God thesis. That is that God has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence. This will undercut all arguments against perfect being theology.^[85] This is impacted by arguments to the effect that an omnipotent, omniscient and totally benevolent God cannot be such together since these properties collide in the face of evil. The maximal God thesis avoids this problem by asserting a maximal consistent set of these properties. The conclusion it reaches with the maximal concept is that there is good reason to think perfect being theism is true, and no good reason to think it is false.

Nagasawa thinks it “allows us to undermine nearly all existing arguments against perfect being theism simultaneously.” In other words, it is a user-friendly edition that eliminates the more difficult elements.^[86] He is concerned that “even if there is no successful argument against perfect being theism, critics can still question if there is a successful argument for perfect being theism.”^[87] He concludes that “we have good reason to think that perfect being theism is true, because the maximal concept of God allows us to refute arguments against perfect being theism while establishing a robust argument for it.”^[88]

The upshot of the maximal being theory, as Nagasawa expounds it is, as he says, “my response to the arguments against perfect being theism is to replace the omni-God thesis with the following thesis: … the Maximal God thesis: God is the being that has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence.” He is therefore “very knowledgeable, very powerful, very benevolent.”^[89] This, I suggest, places God on a level with creatures – just that he is better, maximally better. As Nagasawa acknowledges, “it does not imply that God is unquestionably an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being.”^[90] If perfect being theists make these claims they do not face the criticisms of perfect being theology. [At what cost, one asks?] Nagasawa continues, “I am not rejecting the omni thesis here. What I am saying is that perfect being theists do not need to worry about the cogency of the omni thesis.”^[91] No they don’t, do they?

Nagasawa does not claim that God is definitely [omni x3] but equally does not claim that he is definitely not [omni x3]. “I claim that this is an open question, on which the cogency of perfect being theism does not hinge” for it is far from obvious that perfect being theology entails the omni-God thesis.^[92] WWAD? (What Would Anselm Do?) I suspect he would reply that one who may be less than omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent is lesser than one who is so and consequently is not the one about whom he was writing and to whom he was praying.

Everything is a Proof for God

Scripture declares that the entire creation displays the greatness of God (e.g. Ps 19:1-6, Rom 1:19-20). This revelation of God’s power and beauty is universal – the heavens and the earth, day and night (Ps 19:1-6).

In Romans 1:19-20, Paul graphically portrays the invisible things of God being clearly visible in creation. The universe is akin to the clothes God wears to display his glory. People are without excuse for suppressing or rejecting this knowledge, clearly seen all around us. It is also a rejection of what is evident within – man as made in the image of God (Rom 1:20f). Calvin wrote of the sensus divinitatis, the well-nigh universal recognition of a supreme being.

In this sense, the creation is an icon, an image through which we are given to perceive transcendent realities. Many are blinded by sin; while recognising the beauty of the world they fail to perceive the one reflected in that beauty. Some are desensitised. I recall being present at the old Academy of Music in Philadelphia for a performance of Mahler’s Das Lied von der Erde with Simon Rattle conducting the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. In the sublime and heartbreaking final movement, Der abschied, some of the most searingly beautiful music Mahler or anyone has written, a man in front of me was looking around the auditorium, yawning and picking his ear. Ultimately, we need what Calvin described as the spectacles of Scripture to bring creation into proper focus.^[93] This is due, not to any deficiency in the revelation itself but rather to the obtuseness of fallen human beings.

Preeminently, God reveals himself in his Son, one with the Father and the Holy Spirit from eternity. “He who has seen me has seen the Father,” he said to Philip (John 14:9). We cannot now see him, but we can hear him, for whenever the gospel is preached, Christ is speaking (Rom 10:14, Eph 2:17 et al.). Supremely at the cross, the eternal Son through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to the Father (Heb 9:14).

This revelation, in creation and grace, is infallible. All God’s revelation is infallible and achieves the purpose for which he gave it. The move in Western culture from Socinianism onwards, through the Enlightenment, and into today’s postmodernism and nihilism is an instance of apostasy, in which the generations of rebellion are bearing fruit. Is the West akin to the first-century world of Paul’s day? In some ways, it is, but we should remember that it was a pagan world that suppressed the knowledge of God in creation but had not yet received the gospel. The West today is doubly apostate. But Romans 1 is not the final judgement; there is still hope.

The main a posteriori arguments, at best, have only partial application. They are arguments for a prime mover, or a first cause, an intelligent designer, and a supreme moral agent. They refer to particular properties of a supreme being but not to that being as such nor to the nature of that being. If successful, they stop well short of identifying that being with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. As such, they aim to prove the existence of an idol, contrary to the first commandment. Moreover, since any argument proceeds on the basis that the agreed starting point is of greater certainty than the conclusion, the conclusion of the argument is in suspense and has to be demonstrated rationally. This makes the premises and the tacitly agreed-upon processes of the argument have greater certainty than the God one is attempting to prove. But God is not a conclusion at the end of a human argument; he is the starting point for any and all arguments and thought.

However, Anselm’s argument has great use for those who already believe. The God who makes himself known in creation, who has spoken definitively in his Son, not only exists but there is no possibility of his ever not existing. As such, he is the source of the entire creation, not as a necessary outflow or emanation from him, which is a form of pantheism or panentheism, but as a free and sovereign act of his will, bringing into existence all other entities, which in their cases are contingent. To align ourselves aright with the reality he has brought into existence, he is to be the source and basis for all we do, whether in action, thought, or argument. This, I suggest, supports the case made by Martyn Lloyd-Jones that the gospel is to be proclaimed, not debated. Thus, in facing a pagan culture, Paul builds on what the people already know and corrects what they don’t know (Acts 14:8-18), while at Athens he assumes the existence of God without attempting to prove it. From the works of God in creation and providence, which are accessible to everyone, he heads straight to Christ. In short, revelation has priority – a move from God to man.

Footnotes

^[1] Apart from simple deductive arguments.

^[2]  In Autobiografia dalle lettere, ed. Carlo Graziani (Verona, 1941), cited in ‘Notes on the Quartets’ by Michael Steinburg in Robert Winter, The Beethoven Quartet Companion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 269.

^[3] William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibnitz (London: Macmillan, 1980), 172–73.

^[4] Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 29.

^[5] Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book One: God (Anthony C. Pegis; London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 95.

^[6] In response to the ideas advanced in the last century of a suffering God, I believe it was Colin Gunton who suggested that these theorists were advocating ‘a most moved unmover.’

^[7] Davies, Aquinas, 27.

^[8] Davies, Aquinas, 29.

^[9] Craig, Cosmological Argument, 160, citing Gilson.

^[10] Davies, Aquinas, 31.

^[11] Aquinas, SCG, 96; J. P. Migne, Patrologia Cursus Completus: Series Graeca (Paris, 1857–66), 94:796; John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 1:3.

^[12] Craig, Cosmological Argument, 193.

^[13] Craig, Cosmological Argument, 195 Here he was in line with Augustine, who held that there can be no accidents in God; Augustine, De Trinitate, 5:3–5:6.

^[14] Craig, Cosmological Argument, 196.

^[15] Aquinas, ST 1a:1:1.

^[16] Aquinas, ST 1a:1:8.

^[17] For instance, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (1268; Samuel E. Thorne; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2:21.

^[18] Davies, Aquinas, 21.

^[19] Davies, Aquinas, 22.

^[20] Davies, Aquinas, 23.

^[21] Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 218–45; John Calvin, Institutes, 1:1–6.

^[22] Davies, Aquinas, 22.

^[23] Calvin, Institutes, 1:1:1–:5:14, esp. 1:3:1–3.

^[24] Robert Tad Lehe, “An Epistemological Argument for the Existence of God,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (William Lane Craig; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 77–97.

^[25] Tad Lehe, “Epistemological Argument,” 96.

^[26] Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual National Prayer Breakfast,” 4 Feb. 1988, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-annual-national-prayer-breakfast, accessed 15 May 2025. A far cry from the embittered politics of today.

^[27] William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2000).

^[28] William F. Lawhead, “The Symmetry of the Past and the Future in the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (William Lane Craig; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), here 99–100.

^[29] Lawhead, “Symmetry,” 100–103.

^[30] Robert Prevost, “Classical Theism and the Kalam Principle,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (William Lane Craig; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), here 114.

^[31] Prevost, “Kalam Principle,” 116.

^[32] Ibid., 118.

^[33] Ibid., 119.

^[34] William Lane Craig, “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (William Lane Craig; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), here 127.

^[35] Craig, “Teleological Argument,” 153.

^[36] “among other things”.

^[37] See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

^[38] Katherin A. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), viii.

^[39] Rogers, Edinburgh, 4.

^[40] Ibid., 1.

^[41] Marilyn McCord Adams, “Anselm on Faith and Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Brian Davies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), here 32. Italics original.

^[42] Anselm, De Incarnatione Verbi, 1; Brian Davies and G.R. Evans, Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 235.

^[43] Anselm, Monologion, Prologue, in Davies and Evans, Anselm, 5–6.

^[44] Brian Leftow, “Anselm’s Perfect Being Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Brian Davies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 132–56, here 132.

^[45] Leftow, “Anselm’s Perfect Being Theology,” 132–34.

^[46] Anselm, Monologion, 1; Davies and Evans, Anselm, 11–12.

^[47] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 82.

^[48] “Fecit quoque libellum unum, quam monologium appellavit: Solus enim in eo secum loquitur, acta cita omni auctoritate divinae Scripturae, quod Deus sit sola ratione, sic nec aliter esse posse probat & astruit. Post haec incidit sibi in mentem investigare, utrum uno solo & brevi argumento probari posset, id quod de Deo creditur & praedicatur: videlicet quod sit aeternus, incommutabilis, omnipotens, ubique totus, incomprehensibilis, iustus, pius, misericors, verax, veritas, bonitas, iustitia, & nonnula alia, & quomodo haec omnia in ipso unum sunt. Quae res sicut ipse referebat, magnam sibi peperit difficultatem. Nam haec cogitatio partim illi cibum, potum, &somnum tollebat: partim & quod magis cum gravabat, intentionem eius qua matutinis & alii servitio Dei intendere debebat, perturbat. … diaboli esse tentationem, niliusque est eam procul repelere a sua intentione.” Eadmer, Fratris Edineri Angli de Vita d. Anselmi Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis: Lib. II Nunquam Antehac Aediti (1124; repr., Antwerp: excudebat Ioannes Gravius, 1551), C3a-b.  My translation.

^[49] “Et ecce quadam nocte inter nocturnas vigilias Dei gratia illuxit in corde eius, & res patuit intellectui, immensoque gaudio & iubilatione replevit omnia intima eius.” Eadmer, De Vita Anselmi, C3b-C4a. My translation.

^[50] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 82.

^[51] Ibid., 83.

^[52] Oxford Latin Dictionary.

^[53] Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of His Theological Scheme (1931; repr., London: SCM, 1960), 14.

^[54] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 84–85.

^[55] Ibid., 85.

^[56] Ibid., 87.

^[57] Adams, “Faith and Reason,” 35–36.

^[58] Ibid., 38.

^[59] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 87 Alternatively, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought.”

^[60] Barth, Anselm, 74.

^[61] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 87.

^[62] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 87–88.

^[63] Ibid., 88.

^[64] Ibid., 88.

^[65] Ibid., 88.

^[66] Brian Davies, “Anselm and the Ontological Argument,” in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Brian Davies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), here163.

^[67] Barth, Anselm, 92.

^[68] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 89.

^[69] Leftow, “Anselm’s Perfect Being Theology,” 140.

^[70] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 96.

^[71] Aquinas, ST 1:2:1. Reply Obj. 2.

^[72] Aquinas, ST 1:2:1. Reply Obj. 3. See also J. Anthony Gaughan, The Ontological Argument: A Critique from a Thomist Perspective (Blackrock, County Dublin: Kingdom Books, 2020).

^[73] Adams, “Faith and Reason,” 50–51. It is well known that people come to Christ by a bewildering variety of means. Since God is the creator of all things, he can use anything he pleases to that end.

^[74] See Lydia Schumacher, “The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Argument: Re-Thinking the Purpose of Proofs for the Existence of God,” Modern Theology 27, no. 1 (January 2011): 87–101, who stresses this point, indicating that Anselm considered that a focus on God would encourage his readers to appreciate his goodness, and be transformed progressively into the image of Christ, which in turn would make their faith intelligible to others.

^[75] Anselm, Monologion, Prologue; Davies and Evans, Anselm, 6. Anselm there asks anyone who thinks he has diverged from the truth to compare what he has written with Augustine, De Trinitate. He himself “was unable to find anything inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and in particular with those of the Blessed Augustine.” See also Gareth Matthews, “Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Brian Davies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 61–83. Matthews comments that both were broadly Platonist philosophers, not from a study of Plato but through intermediaries. Yet “the Platonic stamp on each of them is difficult to miss.” 81-82.

^[76] Miroslaw Szatkowski, Ontological Proofs Today: Philosophische Analyse (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2012).

^[77] Tyron Goldschmidt, Ontological Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 1–2.

^[78] Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 85–86.

^[79] Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin, 2006), 42. Italics original.

^[80] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 111, cited by Goldschmidt, Ontological Arguments, 36.

^[81] Goldschmidt, Ontological Arguments, 38–39.

^[82] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 112, cited by Goldschmidt, Ontological Arguments, 38.

^[83] Goldschmidt, Ontological Arguments, 49.

^[84] Yujin Nagosawa, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

^[85] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 207.

^[86] Nagosawa, Maximal God, 2.

^[87] Ibid., 3.

^[88] Ibid., 4.

^[89] Ibid., 92.

^[90] Ibid., 93.

^[91] Davies and Evans, Anselm, 93.

^[92] Nagosawa, Maximal God, 93–94.

^[93] Calvin, Institutes, 1:6.